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Abstract—encointer proposes a new blockchain based cryp-
tocurrency with an ecological consensus mechanism using trusted
execution environments and an egalitarian money supply policy.
Money issuance is done through a universal basic income subject
to a proof-of-personhood. Only individuals attending randomized
pseudonym key signing events obtain such proofs. encointer also
features private transactions and scalable, trustless off-chain
smart contracts.
Index Terms—cryptocurrency, macroeconomics, identity man-
agement, location awareness, privacy, energy efficiency
I. MOTIVATION
A. Economics
With the appearance of Bitcoin [1] in 2008, a big socio-
economic experiment took off. The nature of money itself
was widely debated. Bitcoin adopts a hard-coded nominally
inflatonary monetary policy saturating at a fixed supply. Rapid
adoption made Bitcoin a real deflationary currency, which
it will remain if successful. Early adopters made a fortune.
Because of its deflationary nature, bitcoin favors accumulation
of capital for the few. Wealth increases without work.
The monetary policy followed by central banks issuing
national fiat money on the other hand often follows the goal
of price stability, aiming at a moderate inflation goal in the
order of 1-2%. Issuance of money is appointed to banks who
give credit to companies who employ workers who consume
goods and thereby make companies profitable and raise the
GDP. A process that allegedly benefits everyone. However, the
observation that an increase in money supply doesn’t benefit
everyone equally is referred to as the Cantillon-Effect [22].
Thomas Piketty shows [23] that gains on capital historically
exceed economic growth, another factor that questions the
trickle-down theory.
encointer aims at turning this logic upside-down and lets
all individuals issue money subject to common rules. In order
to mint encointer , people need to attend to pseudonym key
signing parties (meetups) that happen at regular intervals at
high sun all over the world within small randomized groups
of people. The encointer issuance therefore represents a form
of universal basic income (UBI) for every person attending
such meetups.
These encointer meetups are at the same time the basis of a
self-sovereign identity claim called proof-of-personhood (PoP)
[2] [3], proving a one-to-one relationship between a person
and her digital identity. One person can only maintain one
individuality claim because ceremonies are designed to make
it impossible to attend two meetups physically as they happen
in different places concurrently.
B. Unpermissioned Consensus
Bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies use an energy-
hungry consensus mechanism called proof of work (PoW).
While PoW has been the key idea that made Bitcoin possible
in the first place, it is not ecologically sustainable. Moreover,
it failed its goal of decentralization as mining has become
centralized by a single company in a single country.
Peercoin [4] introduced the first proof-of-stake (PoS) cryp-
tocurrency in 2012. Until today, PoS is not academically
respected as a sound consensus mechanism [5]. While PoW
makes a compromise on energy efficiency, PoS makes the
compromise of benefitting the rent-seeking wealthy.
Accepting that there’s always a compromise to make, en-
cointer introduces dPoET; a permissionless version of proof-
of-elapsed-time (PoET) [6], relying on trusted execution en-
vironments (TEE). PoET requires trust in vendor attestation
services. Currently, there are few TEE vendors on the market
(i.e. Intel SGX [7], ARM trust zone [9] used by AMD,
Qualcomm and others) but there are also open-source hardware
initiatives that might one day diversify the attestation trust.
C. Private Smart Contracts
In 2015 Ethereum [16] was introduced, bringing turing-
complete smart contracts to the blockchain. Ethereum now
serves as a platform for many decentralized applications
(DApps) and has become the major ecosystem for ICOs.
While enabling publicly verifyable smart contracts, there is no
way to process private data on Ethereum in trustless manner.
Public unpermissioned validation of smart contracts is only
possible with a minimum of public inputs. Support for zk-
SNARKS has been added to the etheremun virtual machine
with the metropolis hard-fork, yet this only enables to verify
zero knowledge proofs that have been generated off-chain. It
is therefore possible to hide the payload of a smart contract
call, but as you have to call the contract by means of a
public transaction, your pseudonym is leaking. Quorum [17],
an Ethereum fork, approaches privacy by delegating smart
contract validation to a small group of permissioned validators
using a BFT consensus and allowing Zcash-style shielded
transactions to hide your pseudonym when calling a private
smart contract. Such setups do not allow GDPR-compliant
DApps [18], [19]. The reasoning is the following: In order
for the DApp to comply with GDPR, the Dapp has to be
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run by a single operator having users opting into his privacy
terms. The operator would then have to run all private contract
validators by himself. Such centralization would render the use
of blockchain meaningless.
encointer enables private, decentralized DApps. As the
internal state of a TEE is not leaking, they offer a way
to run smart contracts with private, encrypted inputs while
still offering verifyability. This has been demonstrated by
Hyperledger Sawtooth Private Data Objects (PDO) [20]. PDOs
allow to take state and execution of smart contracts off chain,
thereby also improving scalability as compared to Ethereum.
D. Transaction Privacy
Bitcoin transactions are pseudonymous but not anonymous.
It has been shown that identities of transacting parties can
be revealed [24]. Aiming at transaction privacy, Monero was
introduced in 2014, employing the CryptoNote protocol [11].
Receiving funds in Monero means scanning every block for
transactions to oneself. This task can only be taken out by full
nodes as delegating it would leak private information.
Zcash was introduced in 2016 empoying the Zerocash
protocol [13] using zk-SNARKS to hide sender, receiver and
value from third parties. Generating SNARKS to send funds
is a computationally heavy process, limiting its usability for
mobile and IoT devices.
For both Monero and ZCash, privacy comes at the price
of large transaction size, letting the blockchain grow quickly.
Being equipped with private smart contracts, encointer only
stores tx hashes on-chain.
E. Scalability
Because of its block size limit, Bitcoin can only reach
about 4-7 transactions per second onchain. In order to tackle
Bitcoin’s scalability issues, Lightning Network payment chan-
nels [14] were introduced in 2015 and demonstrated in 2017.
Scalability is achieved by bilaterally treating transactions off-
chain with the option to settle the last balance at any time
on-chain. Teechan [15] was introduced in 2017, implementing
payment channels in TEEs.
encointer takes transactions and smart contract execution
off-chain altogether. Only one hash per transaction must be
stored onchain. The latest state is shared among validators but
only the hash of that state needs to be onchain. This improves
scalability by an order of magnitude and delays the need for
second layer solutions.
F. Governance
Decentralized blockchain governance has in the past been
tried by various means. In the case of Bitcoin, a balance of
power between miners and coin holders decides about the
future of the protocol, which lead to multiple chain forks in the
past, hurting the ecosystem and dividing development teams.
PoS blockchains delegate governance to their whales. Who
has more coin has more say. This poses a conflict of interest
i.e. in the case of deciding the future nominal inflation.
As encointer has an anti-sybil attack measure in place (PoP),
a one-person-one-vote (1p1v) scheme could be implemented.
Fig. 1. Possible public meetup locations for a local currency
However, there is a conflict of interest as well because low-
wealth individuals are expected to vote in favor of higher
inflation as they directly benefit in the short term due to their
role as money issuers in encointer .
encointer suggests a novel approach to blockchain gover-
nance, delegating blockchain governance to a Swiss associa-
tion holding the encointer trademark. The association suggests
protocol updates in advance, including changes of nominal
inflation rate, tx tax burn rate, block size limit. Suggestions
by the association can be blocked by a referendum vote
requiring a majority of 2/3 of stake and 2/3 majority of
1p1v voters. Balloting happens on-chain anonymously. The
2/3 majority threshold for referendums allows the association
to react quickly to changing circumstances but still provide
decentralization, given large opposition.
If the encointer association should fail to suggest necessary
changes, the community may suggest changes as well. They
also require a majority of 2/3 of stake and 2/3 majority of
1p1v voters.
II. LOCAL CURRENCIES
Encointer has no single currency. It manages an unper-
missioned set of many local currencies. Every geographically
bound community can have their own local currency.
A. Bootstrapping a Local Currency
Initiators of a new local encointer currency need to define its
geographical bound by a large set of possible publicly accessi-
ble meetup locations as shown in figure 1. As people will have
to attend some meetup at a random location from the above
set, the geographical extension should be chosen reasonably
such that people only need to travel within acceptable ranges.
In order to improve meetup randomization, the set of possible
meetup locations should be chosen larger than the region’s
population size. The location set can later be modified by on-
chain governance only.
Then the initiators need to perform a trusted setup ceremony
with 3-12 participants. An encointer local currency should only
Fig. 2. Nominal inflation rate per ceremony for a fictional participation curve
following an S-curve.
be trusted if it was bootstrapped with a public trusted setup
ceremony. In the best case you find locally renowned people
to participate in the first ceremony. For the trusted setup it
is recommended that public keys used for the ceremony are
made public by their owners.
B. Urban Scalability
The most densely inhabitated city currently is Manila with
43′000/km2 [29]. With a limit of 10 people per meetup and
a participation of 100% , 4300 meetups would take place per
km2. Each meetup would be allowed an area of 232m2 and
the distance between meetup locations would be rs,i ≈ 15m.
III. MONETARY POLICY
Unlike Bitcoin, encointer currencies don’t have a hard-
capped supply. The more people are joining the ecosystem,
the more money is issued. Every PoP-ceremony participant
will receive one reward per attended ceremony. The value of
one unit is therefore connected to the willingness of people to
spend time to attend key signing parties. Beyond issuance, the
possibility of obtaining a digital identity might be especially
beneficial in developing countries where people might own a
mobile phone but not a state-issued ID.
The total coin supply M0 after K parties with Ni total
participants for party i can be expressed as
M0 =
K∑
i=0
Ni −D (1)
D being the total of burned ceremony deposits.
Exponential community growth causes exponential growth
of money supply. If community participation should one day
saturate, money issuance will be constant and relative inflation
rate will therefore decrease over time as shown in figure 2.
With such a policy in place, no early adopter should expect
to get rich by hoarding as adoption drives inflation.
IV. POP CEREMONIES
Key signing ceremonies will be scheduled every 41 days.
The interval of 41 days is an arbitrary design choice. In order
for many people to be able to participate, it should be at
different weekdays every time and it shouldn’t happen too
often - but often enough that missing one ceremony doesn’t
hurt too much. All meetups will happen at high sun at the same
date all over the world. This is crucial because we want nobody
to be able to attent two meetups for the same ceremony,
because this would allow a single person to maintain more
than one PoP identity (a Sybil attack).
A. Preparation
At least 24h before the first meetup of a ceremony, par-
ticipant a creates a registration transaction for ceremony i
containing
Kpuba,i one-time public key
Ss,j a ring signature proving ceremony j < i was at-
tended with group s last time. The ring consisting of
all participants of ceremony j at location Ls,j .
L The local currency’s identifyer
da,i minimum deposit for counterparties
S(tx) a deposit in encointer to be redeemed after atten-
dance
For each local currency, the system then assigns randomized
groups of 3 to 12 people to random meetup locations 24h prior
the ceremony. In order to mitigate collusion, the assignment
algorithm will ensure that at most 50% of all participants have
met at a meetup for the last ceremony already.
The lower limit to meetup size of 3 participants shall
provide some safety (see IV-D5). The upper limit of 12
attendees shall make sure that meetups can be taken out within
short time and to allow each participant to remember who
she/he has already signed keys with.
B. Meetup Procedure
Key signing must begin within ∆ts,i after Ts,i. No latecom-
ers may be accepted.
∆ts,i =
min (dist (Ls,i, Lk, i))
vmax
∀k ∈ S (2)
Where vmax = 300km/h is an encointer parameter set to
make it impractical to attend two adjacent ceremonies, even
when using a helicopter.
Attendees each vote on the number of physically present
participants. They then attest the physical presence of all
counterparties by pairwise key-signing performed with the
encointer mobile phone app.
Each attendee sends his/her collected signatures to the chain.
The system then verifies a set of rules before issuing rewards:
• only registered participants assigned to the same meetup
can sign each others claims
• ballot the votes on the number
C. Unique Proof-of-Personhood
Attending one meetup supplies the individual with a sim-
ple proof-of-personhood. However, it doesn’t prove that one
individual maintains exactly one id. The more subsequent
ceremonies an individual attends, the more trustworthy is
his/her PoP claim with respect to uniqueness.
D. Attacks and Mitigation
1) Illegit Videoconference: People may try to meet virtually
instead of physically.
2) Surrogates: An adversary might pay other people to
attend ceremonies on behalf of identities controlled by the
adversary. The effect is similar to people renting out their
identity. This can’t be prevented by means of a pseudonym
party.
3) Social Engineering: Attendees might talk others into
signing more than one pseudonym. Bribery could happen too.
4) Systematic No-Show: a meeting might become invalid if
too many participants don’t show up. No shows are punished
by burning the deposit.
5) Threats to Personal Safety: As ceremony members need
to meet in person, all risks involved with human encounters
apply. These risks are reduced by randomizing participants
and by the minimal group size of 3 persons. Participants are
advised to choose public places for ceremonies. Threats by
non-participants who want to hurt the encointer ecosystem by
attacking participants are mitigated if group s keeps their exact
meeting point private.
V. DPOET CONSENSUS
The major technical innovation of Bitcoin is its use of
PoW to avoid double spends in a decentralized digital cash
scheme. The higher the cost of a double spend attack, the more
secure the Bitcoin blockchain. The security of Bitcoin relies
on mining power. Miners invest in infrastructure and energy
as long as this remains profitable. Mining power therefore
depends on the real value of miner income being proportional
to Bitcoin exchange rate.
PoS blockchain security on the other hand relies on game
theory. Gaining control over the majority of stake to attack
a PoS chain would destroy the real value of that stake,
hurting the attacker most. PoS blockchain security therefore is
proportional to its total market capitalization. A yet unsolved
issue with PoS is the nothing-at-stake dilemma [5] which may
cause uncontrollable forks.
PoET has similar security properties like PoW as it is just
an energy-efficient replacement for PoW to elect the validator
who may write the next block to the blockchain. Each validator
TEE samples a uniform random number u ∈ [0..1) and waits
for an exponentially distributed wait time defined by:
t = − ln(1− u)
λ
(3)
λ has to be adjusted to validator population size to reach
a defined average block time, similar to Bitcoin’s difficulty
adjustment.
Everyone with a supported TEE hardware can join the
validator set and gets equal probability of being selected to
generate the next block. Therefore, the 51% (double spend)
attack applies to PoET as well. The difference is just that it’s
not 51% of PoW mining power but 51% of TEE devices in
the network.
encointer makes such an attack very expensive by demand-
ing that every validator must be linked to a unique person.
Every person maintaining her PoP may run at most one
validator.
Each encointer validator node waits a random time before
generating a new block according to PoET. It then assembles
transactions into a block including a PoET and broadcasts the
block to the network.
In bitcoin, all nodes believe in the blockchain accumulating
the most PoW since genesis. In encointer , nodes believe in the
blockchain accumulating the highest PoET difficulty
∑
i
1
λi
.
We call this consensus algorithm democratic proof of elapsed
time (dPoET)
A. Settlement Finality
Like PoW, dPoET only delivers probabilistic transaction
finality.
VI. TRUSTED EXECUTION ENVIRONMENT SECURITY
TEEs aim to provide the necessary guarantees for secure
remote computation. They should provide integrity and confi-
dentiality guarantees when executing software on a computer
maintained by an untrusted party. The most recent TEEs rely
on software attestation, a process that guarantees the user that
she’s communicating with a known piece of code running
inside a secure container on a genuine trusted hardware by
means of a manufacturer signature.
As criticized in [7], manufacturers seem to follow a security
by obscurity principle not disclosing design internals necessary
for a proper security review. Their in dubio contra reum anal-
ysis of Intel SGX shows vulnerabilities to cache timing and
sidechannel attacks. Foreshadow [8] falsified confidentiality as
well as integrity claims for SGX but the attack is mitigated for
now. ARM TrustZone on the other hand is only an IP core and
design details are left to the manufacturer, equally reluctant to
disclose details.
Since at least the post-Snowden era, one also has to be
concerned about manufacturers being forced by their state to
introduce deliberate backdoors. Even if open-source TEEs like
Keystone [27] might soon deliver devices, one would still have
to trust the manufacturer not to tamper with the design.
While all this is disturbing, it should be put in perspective.
Information security is a never-ending race. All blockchain
solutions are software running by large part on Intel CPUs.
While hardware wallets may give us some comfort concerning
our funds private keys, there’s no guarantee on confidentiality
when considering sidechannel attacks.
The encointer cooperative will follow developments closely
and maintain an up to date list of accepted TEE manufacturers’
attestation keys. Even if the author is not satisfied with
today’s TEEs security guarantees, he considers the ecological
downsides of PoW to be much more severe for society as a
whole and therefore proposes to make heavy use of TEEs for
encointer .
VII. PROPORTIONAL TRANSACTION FEES
Bitcoin transactions may pay a fee to the miner including
the transaction in his block. Because Bitcoin has a hard
cap on block size, a market develops for fees and miners
choose the best-paying transactions to fill a block. This effect
prevents micropayments effectively undermining adoption in
developing countries. While IOTA [25] and Nano [26] have
zero transaction fees they must use a small PoW as a measure
against spam transactions. Even though small, PoW limits the
possibilities to use mobile or IoT devices to send transactions.
encointer suggests yet another way: Each transaction must
include a PoET of 0.5 seconds as an anti-spam measure. This
PoET can be delegated to any remote-attested TEE. Nowadays,
even mobile devices feature a TEE and would therefore be
able to provide a PoET. However, there is no manufacturer
yet who provides remote attestation for these mobile phone
TEEs. This may be possible in the future. Requiring a TEE
to send transactions comes with a nice side benefit: The TEE
can be used as a hardware wallet for private keys, effectively
mitigating the weakest link in blockchain security by solving
the safekeeping of private keys for hot wallets.
Still, validator nodes need an incentive for encointer to
benefit from a large decentralized network of validators. In the
spirit of the Tobin Tax [10] it seems beneficial to the encointer
ecosystem to charge a proportional transaction fee in the order
of 0.1% to incentivize validator nodes to process transactions.
In the presence of indirect block size limitations like TEE
memory size, a proportional fee may still inhibit micropay-
ments as validators might select high-value transactions with
priority. That is left to be solved when we get there.
encointer targets a balance of power among multiple TEE
vendors as it is unlikely that different vendors collude or show
the same vulnerabilities. Such a balance of power must be
incentivized in order to take place. One possible incentive
would be to burn a fraction of tx fees that is proportional
to the network share of the validor’s TEE vendor. Minority
TEEs would earn more fees than majority TEEs.
VIII. PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
Fig 3 shows how transactions are processed in encrypted
form. Alice creates a transaction to Bob and encrypts it with
the shared verifier key KpubV . She then appends a PoET PET
and sends the tx to the network. If her device has no TEE, she
can delegate the PoET to any third party, whereby she only
shares the encrypted tx with the PoET provider.
The validator retrieves the most recent statet−1 (i.e. from
IPFS [30]), assembles transactions from its mempool and
sends everything to its TEE. The TEE is able to decrypt
the data to process the clearing. It then writes hashes of a
transaction to the new block together with the hash of the
encrypted new statet and a signature, proving which validator
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Fig. 3. simplified private transaction scheme
created the block. The new block only contains hashes, so no
private information is leaking.
In order for Bob to know he received funds, Alice sends
him the plaintext txA over a private messaging channel. Bob
can then hash it and scan the blockchain for h(txA). Both
Alice and Bob then must make sure to store txA securely
and redundantly as they can’t retrieve their wallet balance by
scanning the blockchain.
A. Enclave Provisioning
The shared symmetric state encryption key KS and asym-
metric transaction submission key KprivV is known to all
registered validators. Whenever the validator set changes, a
new key KprivV has to be established among all validators’
enclaves who can then derive KS . A distributed key generation
scheme like [32] or [31] or shall be applied for that purpose.
The shared key is expected to change frequently, thereby
improving forward-secrecy in the case of side-channel attacks.
Registering a new enclave for chain validation includes the
following steps:
1) initialize encointer enclave
2) perform remote attestation with a trusted attestation
service (registered on the encointer chain)
3) commit attestation service quote to encointer chain
4) all existing validators see that the validator set changed.
They validate the quote and take out a new distributed
key generation.
IX. PRIVATE OFF-CHAIN SMART CONTRACTS
The concept of private transactions explained above can
be extended to allow private calls of generic stateful smart
contracts.
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Fig. 4. simplified smart contract call scheme
encointer separates transaction validation consensus from
smart contract execution. Unlike Ethereum, encointer doesn’t
need to execute a smart contract on every validator machine.
Thanks to TEEs, it would be sufficient to run smart contracts
on one TEE only, as correct execution is guaranteed. For
resilience, it is of course desirable to have more than one
contract TEE.
encointer Dapps provide their own TEE infrastructure in
order to provide their services. This way, they’re responsible
for termination properties of their contracts without any impact
on the encointer main chain. Metered execution like gas is not
necessary, opening up a new range of possibilites.
Fig 4 shows how encointer transactions allow for an op-
tional payload Λ which gets included in a call table callst.
encointer hereby provides a sequential ordering of smart
contract calls and all the information needed to process the
call is included in callst, as shown in Fig. 5.
It is up to the Dapp to provide TEEs with their contract
key KC . Dapp users should make sure the contract code is
open source and KC is a manufacturer-attested TEE output.
Dapps can be stateful and their hashed state can be anchored
in encointer chain by including a KC signed transaction txC,t
to itself. txC,t should be published in cleartext so anyone can
verify execution.
Related concepts were presented by [33], [20]
X. encointer ASSOCIATION
encointer association is a not-for-profit association under
Swiss law. Its purpose is to govern the encointer ecosystem.
It fulfills the following tasks
• community bootstrapping
hdr
KC1 K
pub
Alice 42 ΛA
e(KpubC1 )
KC2 K
pub
l 2 Λl
e(KpubC2 )
Fig. 5. calls table structure
• protocol updates
• define tx fee
• maintain list of accepted TEE attestation service keys
All changes are subject to a referendum by the community.
XI. KNOWN LIMITATIONS
A. Scalability
The proposed encointer protocol assumes that the entire
state can fit into secure memory within a TEE. This limits
the number of accounts that can be registered.
XII. CONCLUSION
A novel cryptocurrency system has been introduced in
conceptual detail. Main contributions are
• A novel global egalitarian approach to monetary policy
allowing for a universal basic income (UBI).
• A new definition of trustless pseudonym key signing
parties for proof-of-personhood (PoP), incentivized by
encointer tokens.
• A novel unpermissioned consensus algorithm dPoET,
combining PoET with PoP to achieve decentralization of
power by ecological means
• Private token transfers with microtransaction-friendly
fees and low storage footprint.
• Scalable trustless private off-chain smart contracts
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